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INHUMANE: HOW THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
SHIELDS COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIERS FROM LEGAL
LIABILITY FOR MISHANDLING HUMAN REMAINS
ABIGAIL A. LAHVIS*

ABSTRACT
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) deregulated the
domestic airline industry. Specifically, the ADA ended the dual
administrative system, which allowed the states to regulate intrastate airfare and permitted the federal government’s Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to regulate interstate airfare. The Act also
included a broad preemption clause to prevent the states from
reimposing economic regulations on air travel. The preemption
clause prohibits a “State . . . [from] enact[ing] or enforc[ing]
any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the
force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any
air carrier.”
The Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA’s preemption
clause expansively and concluded that only state law claims with
a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” relationship to an airline’s
services survive preemption. Yet, the Supreme Court has never
defined the key word: Service. Today, federal circuit courts disagree on the definition of “service,” and a majority have adopted
the Fifth Circuit’s definition articulated in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
Applying the Supreme Court’s expansive view of the ADA’s
preemption clause, the Fifth Circuit defined the term “service”
as all bargained-for air carrier services, including “ticketing,
boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage
handling, in addition to the transportation itself.” The Fifth Circuit’s definition preempts almost all conceivable state law claims
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25172/jalc.87.4.5
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despite the Supreme Court excepting claims with a “tenuous,
remote, or peripheral” relationship to an airline’s services from
preemption. Consequently, the aviation industry largely evades
state law.
This Comment argues that courts should interpret the ADA’s
preemption clause more narrowly to allow more state law claims
to survive preemption, particularly claims arising from an airline’s mishandling, delaying, or misplacing of a loved one’s remains. As the COVID-19 pandemic claims lives and frustrates air
travel, a perfect storm threatens to mishandle, delay, or misplace a loved one’s remains. Grieving mothers, fathers, husbands, and wives are left without a legal remedy because the
ADA shields the airline industry from liability concerning “baggage handling” and the “transportation itself.” Courts should interpret the ADA’s preemption clause more narrowly based on
the ADA’s clear purpose, the plain meaning of the ADA’s text,
stare decisis, and the law’s treatment of other entities that mishandle human remains.
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INTRODUCTION

O

NCE UPON A TIME, the aviation industry1 wanted government regulation.2 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 consolidated aviation regulation in a single federal agency and
authorized regulation of commercial air transportation to promote growth and maintain low airfares.3 Shortly after that Act’s
passage, World War II increased the government’s aviation regulation.4 Additional regulations included increasing a pilot’s
monthly maximum hours,5 developing public airports,6 and authorizing navigation of foreign aircraft in the United States.7
Myriad revisions to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 eventually
led to a new Act: the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.8 This Act
created an independent regulatory agency called the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), which regulated the use of navigable air
space, prescribed air traffic rules, and conducted research and
development activities for the aviation industry.9 Government
regulation reached an apex in the 1970s, alarming legislators
about the anticompetitive effects of government control over
prices, routes, and services on air carriers.10
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) deregulated the
domestic airline industry.11 Specifically, the Act rejected the pre1 For purposes of this Comment, “aviation industry” refers to the business sector that manufactures and operates aircraft, including commercial air carriers.
See Aviation, VOCABULARY.COM, https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/aviation
[https://perma.cc/S49S-4EFT].
2 Clinton M. Hester, The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 9 J. AIR L. & COM. 451,
452 (1938).
3 Id. at 452–53; see also Edward M. Kennedy, Airline Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 607, 609 (1975).
4 John M. Lindsey, The Legislative Development of Civil Aviation 1938-1958, 28 J.
AIR L. & COM. 18, 20 (1962).
5 Act of Apr. 29, 1942, ch. 266, § 1, 56 Stat. 265.
6 Federal Airport Act, Pub. L. No. 79-377, 60 Stat. 170 (1946).
7 Act of Aug. 8, 1953, ch. 379, Pub. L. No. 83-225, 67 Stat. 489.
8 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
9 Lindsey, supra note 4, at 32.
10 See Severin Borenstein, The Evolution of U.S. Airline Competition, 6 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 45, 46–47 (1992).
11 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
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vious dual administrative system, which allowed the states to regulate intrastate airfare and the federal government’s CAB to
regulate interstate airfare.12 The Act included a broad preemption clause to prevent the states from reimposing economic regulations on air travel.13 The preemption clause prohibited a
“State . . . [from] enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of
law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.”14 Additionally, the Act preserved the “savings” clause that originated
in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and endured in the Federal
Aviation Act of 195815—“Nothing contained in this Act shall in
any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute . . . .”16 Some courts interpret the Act’s preemption clause “more broadly” than a mere “limitation on state economic regulation of airlines,”17 rendering the savings clause
meaningless and shielding airlines from state law claims touching almost all aspects of air transport.
The Supreme Court expansively defined the scope of the
ADA’s preemption clause in a trilogy of cases.18 Only those state
law claims with a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” relationship
to an airline’s services survive preemption.19 Yet, the Supreme
Court has never defined the key word: service.20 Federal circuit
courts disagree on the definition of “service,”21 with a majority
Id. § 105(b)(1), (c).
Id. § 105(a)(1).
14 Id.
15 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Federal Preemption of State Regulation of Airline Pricing,
Routes, and Services: The Airline Deregulation Act, 10 FIU L. REV. 435, 438 (2015)
(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1958)).
16 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798.
17 Dempsey, supra note 15, at 438.
18 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992); Am.
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995); Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S.
273, 276 (2014).
19 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
20 See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Morales
informs but does not squarely resolve this case.”), aff’d en banc, 44 F.3d 334, 336
(5th Cir. 1995).
21 Compare Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir.
1998) (“Congress used the word ‘service’ in the phrase ‘rates, routes, or service’
in the ADA’s preemption clause to refer to the prices, schedules, origins and
destinations of the point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail”),
with Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 1998)
(adopting the Ninth Circuit’s definition of “service” because it “offers a more
promising solution” for resolving the definition of services).
12
13
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adopting the Fifth Circuit’s definition articulated in Hodges v.
Delta Airlines, Inc.22
Applying the Supreme Court’s expansive view of the ADA’s
preemption clause, the Fifth Circuit defined the term “service”
as all bargained-for air carrier services, including “ticketing,
boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage
handling, in addition to the transportation itself.”23 The Fifth
Circuit’s definition preempts almost all conceivable state law
claims despite the Supreme Court excepting state law claims
with a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” relationship to an airline’s services from preemption.24 Consequently, the aviation industry largely evades state laws25—even those protecting the
revered right to a decent burial.
The tragedy of the COVID-19 pandemic plagues Americans.26
To date, more than 1 million Americans have died of COVID19.27 The Center for Disease Control’s (CDC’s) data indicate
that 385,443 Americans died due to COVID-19 in 2020, and
446,197 Americans did so in 2021.28 COVID-19 also overwhelmed the aviation industry, hitting commercial airlines espe22 See Hodges, 4 F.3d at 354 (defining “service” to include elements of bargain
such as “ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation itself”); see also Bower v. Egyptair
Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2013) (same); Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134
F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1433 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Arapahoe Cnty. Pub.
Airport Auth. v. FAA, 242 F.3d 1213, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Koutsouradis
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 427 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005) (same).
23 Hodges, 4 F.3d at 354.
24 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
25 See Craig Konnoth, Privatization’s Preemptive Effects, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1937,
1945 (2021) (arguing that private entities are displacing state law unnoticed
through four different approaches, one of which is the contractual preemption
approach where “the federal government preempts state regulation in an area of
law, and, instead of regulating in itself, formally or informally allows the rules of
interaction in the space to be determined by private contract.”).
26 Arielle Mitropoulos, ‘Unthinkable Tragedy’: U.S. COVID-19 Death Toll Surpasses
1 Million, ABC NEWS (May 12, 2022, 5:33 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/
unthinkable-tragedy-us-covid-19-death-toll-surpasses/story?id=84502918 [https://
perma.cc/9PRU-ZEFW].
27 COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#datatracker-home [https://perma.cc/8CGWE63U] (Sept. 29, 2022).
28 Nusaiba Mizan, Fact-Check: Did More Americans Die from COVID-19 in 2021 than
in 2020?, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Jan. 16, 2022, 7:00 AM), https://
www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/politifact/2022/01/16/fact-check-didmore-people-die-covid-19-2021-than-2020/8858993002/ [https://perma.cc/
S8Z7-6RWD]; see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 27.
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cially hard.29 Global airline revenues fell 55% in 2020,30
commercial aircraft manufacturers incurred $12 billion in
losses,31 and the number of passengers fell by 2.703 billion.32
Where COVID-19’s effects—death and uncertain air travel—intersect, a void of justice exists. Commercial airlines are probably
not liable for mishandling a loved one’s remains. This Comment
highlights this injustice and argues that an overly broad interpretation of the ADA’s preemption clause perpetuates this
injustice.
Part II describes the impractical, imprecise laws governing
death and applies them to the COVID-19 tragedy. Section II.A
establishes the legal foundation for the right to a decent burial
and inventories the legal claims that arise when an entity interferes with the right. State property, tort, and contract laws govern the right to a decent burial and the causes of action
available to enforce it. Section II.B explains the perfect storm
created by the COVID-19 pandemic: Unprecedented death relies on frustrated air travel for a final flight home.
Part III explains how the federal laws—governing the airline
industry—and the state laws—governing death—interact. Section III.A outlines the Supreme Court’s cases interpreting the
ADA. Section III.B then clarifies how the Fifth Circuit resolved
the legal questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court in a
way that limits the viability of a plaintiff’s state law claims.
Part IV argues that federal courts should narrowly interpret
the ADA to allow more state law claims—specifically state law
claims arising from the mishandling of human remains—to survive preemption. Section IV.A suggests that Congress did not intend the ADA to preempt most state law claims. Congress only
intended to shield the airline industry from state economic regulations affecting air travel. Section IV.B then addresses the discrepancies between the plain meaning of “service” and,
subsequently, “baggage handling” versus the Fifth Circuit’s defi29 JAAP BOUWER, VIK KRISHNAN, STEVE SAXON & CAROLINE TUFFT, MCKINSEY &
CO., TAKING STOCK OF THE PANDEMIC’S IMPACT ON GLOBAL AVIATION 3 (2022),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-logistics-and-infrastructure/our-insights/taking-stock-of-the-pandemics-impact-on-global-aviation [https://
perma.cc/4MTQ-HMEC].
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Int’l. Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Effects of Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) on
Civil Aviation: Economic Impact Analysis 5 (June 10, 2022), https://www.icao.int/
sustainability/Documents/Covid-19/ICAO_coronavirus_Econ_Impact.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VXH5-N95Q].
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nition. Section IV.C applies stare decisis factors to Hodges and
concludes that the Fifth Circuit should overrule its precedent.
The Fifth Circuit’s hair-splitting between an airline’s “services”
and “operation and maintenance” promotes uncertainty and
anomalous results among the district courts. Section IV.D juxtaposes commercial air carriers’ and other entities’ legal liability
for mishandling human remains. Delaying the interment of a
loved one’s remains is always “repugnant to the sentiment of humanity,”33 regardless of the entity perpetuating the delay. Part V
concludes.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

STATE LAW: IMPOSING LIABILITY FOR CONDUCT AFFECTING
HUMAN BODY DIRECTLY

A

Death is unique. It is unlike aught else in its certainty and its
incidents. A corpse in some respects is the strangest thing on
[E]arth. A man who but yesterday breathed and thought and
walked among us has passed away. Something has gone. The
body is left still and cold, and is all that is visible to mortal eye of
the man we knew. Around it cling[s] love and memory. Beyond it
may reach hope. It must be laid away. And the law-that rule of
action which touches all human things-must touch also this thing
of death. It is not surprising that the law relating to this mystery
of what death leaves behind cannot be precisely brought within
the letter of all the rules regarding corn, lumber[,] and pig
iron.34

1.

Property Law: The Right to a Decent Burial

American common law recognizes the right to a decent burial.35 To understand the right’s legal foundation and the legal
claims that arise when an entity interferes with the right, this
Comment briefly discusses the right’s common law origins.
American common law derives primarily from English common law;36 however, some exceptions exist. The Church of England dictated burial rules and adjudicated disputes regarding
33 Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1041 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1934, writ
ref’d), superseded by statute, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002, as recognized in SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Nelson, 540 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. 2018).
34 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905).
35 See, e.g., Nelson, 540 S.W.3d at 545.
36 See
Common Law, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/common_law [https://perma.cc/6H9K-ZEWZ].
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human remains in the 18th century.37 English legal scholars understood matters of death to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Church of England. Lord Edward Coke wrote that a “cadaver . . . is nullius in bonis,” the property of no one.38 Sir William
Blackstone also addressed the property status of human
remains:
[T]hough the heir has a property in the monuments and cutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes; nor
can he bring any civil action against such as indecently, at least if
not impiously, violate and disturb their remains, when dead and
buried. The parson, indeed, who has the freehold of the soil,
may bring an action of trespass against such as dig and disturb it;
and if any one in taking up a dead body steals the shroud or
other apparel, it will be felony; for the property thereof remains
in the executor, or whoever was at the charge of the funeral.39

No legal property right existed in human remains under English common law. The only legal rights attached to corpses
rested with the “parson,” or priest in the Church of England,
who could pursue legal remedies for trespass in ecclesiastical
courts.40 Because English common law on burial rights reflected
ecclesiastical laws not adopted in America, American common
law differed.41
American common law established a “quasi-property right” in
a corpse for a decedent’s next of kin.42 Courts did not establish
37 Tanya D. Marsh, When Dirt and Death Collide: Legal and Property Interests in
Burial Places, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/real_property_trust_estate/publications/probate-property-magazine/
2016/march_april_2016/
2016_aba_rpte_pp_v30_2_article_marsh_when_dirt_and_death_collide/ [https:/
/perma.cc/GUP7-5B9J].
38 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
203 (London, 4th ed. 1669).
39 Steve Russell, Sacred Ground: Unmarked Graves Protection in Texas Law, 4 TEX.
F. ON C.L. & C.R. 3, 9 (1998) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
428 (3d ed. 1884)).
40 Id. at 10.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. I (forbidding the government from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”);
see also Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238–39 (Minn. 1891).
42 See Walter F. Kuzenski, Property in Dead Bodies, 9 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 17 (1924);
see also Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1934, writ
ref’d) (“There is no property in a dead man’s body, in the usually recognized
sense of the word, yet it may be considered as a sort of quasi property, in which
certain persons have rights therein, and have duties to perform.”), superseded by
statute, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002, as recognized in SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Nelson, 540 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. 2018).
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an absolute property right in a corpse because the legal principles underpinning property ownership inadequately defined the
relationship between a next of kin and a decedent’s body. Property law uses the “bundle of rights” or “bundle of sticks” metaphor to describe the legal rights attached to property
ownership.43 The “bundle of rights” includes the right to possess
or occupy, the right to use or exploit, the right to exclude, the
right to transfer, and the right to modify or destroy the land.44 A
decedent’s next of kin does not possess the same legal rights.
For example, the Texas Penal Code prohibits any knowing or
intentional offer to buy, sell, acquire, receive, sell, or otherwise
transfer “any human organ for valuable consideration.”45 The
Texas Penal Code also prohibits the knowing offensive treatment of, vandalism of, or damage to a corpse that has been permanently laid to rest.46 The awkward application of wellestablished property rights to human remains resulted in a common law quasi-property right.
The quasi-property right established different legal rights, including the rights of holding and protecting the body until it is
processed for burial, cremation[,] or other lawful disposition; selecting the place and manner of disposition, and carrying out the
burial or other last rites; and the right to the undisturbed repose
of the remains in a grave, crypt, niche, urn, or elsewhere sanctioned by law.47

Interfering with a next of kin’s quasi-property right is an actionable wrong enforced by state tort and contract laws.48 State
law also determines the next of kin who can exercise the quasiproperty right.49 This Comment focuses primarily on Texas law.
State law determines the next of kin who can exercise the
quasi-property right based on a priority list of the decedent’s
See, e.g., Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 709–10 (Tex. 2012).
See, e.g., Gerald R. Barber, Bundle of Rights Approach to Value, TEX. LAND CONSERVATION ASSISTANCE NETWORK, https://www.texaslandcan.org/article/BundleOf-Rights-Approach-To-Value/117 [https://perma.cc/NEK4-N942].
45 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02(b).
46 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.08(a)(5).
47 HUGH Y. BERNARD, THE LAW OF DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD 13 (1966).
48 See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. 2012)
(quoting Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 880 (Colo. 1994)); Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238–39 (Minn. 1891) (stating the primary concern of
the right exists in the emotional or physical pain or suffering to surviving family
members based in tort law).
49 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(a).
43
44
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legal and biological relationships.50 The Texas Health and
Safety Code prioritizes the decedent’s surviving spouse, who
maintains the principal right to control the disposition of the
decedent’s remains.51 If no surviving spouse exists, the right belongs to the next in line. The Code then prioritizes the decedent’s surviving adult children, parents, and adult siblings.52
The law seems easy to enforce (methodically following the priority list); however, the difficulties that troubled the decedent in
life do not die with their death.
The decedent’s spouse or next of kin can forfeit the quasiproperty right or be deprived of the right by other means. For
example, a surviving spouse convicted of family violence against
the decedent53 or divorced before death forfeits the principal
right.54 A surviving parent who does not maintain legal custody
over the decedent during their lifetime forfeits the right.55 Any
legally or biologically related family member may be deprived of
the right by the government if the decedent’s remains are
unidentifiable or comingled,56 or the decedent’s will, prepaid
funeral contract, or signed and acknowledged written instrument provides otherwise.57 The decedent’s spouse or next of kin
needs to possess the quasi-property right before enforcing it in
tort or contract law.
2.

Tort Law: Enforcing the Right to a Decent Burial

Tort law provides an action for mishandling human remains
without a contract.58 The Restatement Second of Torts provides,
“One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or
prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability
Id. § 711.002(a)(1).
Id. § 711.02(a)(2).
52 Id. § 711.02(a)(3)–(5).
53 Id. § 711.002(k)(l).
54 Id. § 711.002(c).
55 Corpse: Burial Rights, AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., https://law.jrank.org/pages/
5774/Corpse-Burial-Rights.html [https://perma.cc/4VEG-CR5L].
56 See WTC Fams. for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F. Supp. 2d
529, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding New York City is not obligated to seek input
from the families of 9/11 victims as to where any unidentified human remains
should be located—the City is only obligated to disclose where the remains will
be located because the quasi property right only extends to the next of kin for
identifiable, recoverable bodies).
57 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002(g).
58 See, e.g., 25A KIMBERLY C. SIMMONS, CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM: DEAD BODIES
§ 41 (2022 ed. 2003).
50
51
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to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the
disposition of the body.”59 An independent legal duty to not
negligently mishandle a corpse exists when one takes care, custody, or control of a loved one’s remains.60
The Restatement’s Comments emphasize that the “property”
right “serve[s] as a mere peg upon which to hang damages for
the mental distress inflicted upon the survivor.”61 One cannot
generally recover for emotional distress damages for property
destruction; however, tort law awards damages for mishandling
human remains, losing a corpse, or interfering with the right to
bury.62 Tort law allows plaintiffs to receive compensation for
mental distress and physical harm resulting from intentional,
reckless, or negligent interference with the body or burial.63
Texas tort law provides for damages to plaintiffs for emotional
distress from mishandling human remains without requiring a
showing of physical injury or physical manifestation of the emotional distress.64 Texas courts often scrutinize emotional distress
damages because the injury can be temporary, trivial, and easily
feigned.65 The courts’ concerns lessen when the emotional distress damages arise from the mishandling of human remains.66
First, courts allow emotional distress damages for “mere negligence without . . . aggravation” if a special likelihood of “genuine and serious mental distress” exists from “special
circumstances.”67 The relationship between a person handling a
decedent’s remains and the decedent’s next of kin creates the
“special circumstances” that “guarantee . . . the claim is not
spurious.”68 Second, an action for emotional distress is recoverable when it is “reasonably foreseeable” and thus opens the door
to liability when one takes care, custody, or control of a loved
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
See SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Nelson, 540 S.W.3d 539, 546–47 (Tex.
2018).
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1979).
62 Id. at case citations by jurisdiction (first citing State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d
1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986); then citing Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc.,
327 S.E.2d 438, 441, 443 (W. Va. 1985)).
63 Id. cmts. a, f, d.
64 See, e.g., Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tex. 1993).
65 Charles E. Cantu, An Essay on the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
in Texas: Stop Saying It Does Not Exist, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 455, 456, 460 (2002).
66 Id. at 461–62.
67 Guth v. Freeland, 28 P.3d 982, 987 (Haw. 2001) (alteration in original)
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54, at 362 (5th ed. 1984)).
68 See id. at 987–88 (alteration in original).
59
60
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one’s remains.69 A reasonable person knows or reasonably
should know that those closely related to the decedent are
“emotionally vulnerable.”70 Third, those who take care, custody,
or control of a loved one’s remains are better situated than the
plaintiff to prevent negligence and pay for the consequences
when negligence occurs.71 For these reasons, Texas law does not
require a physical injury or physical manifestation of emotional
distress for a claim to be compensable.72
3.

Contract Law: Enforcing the Right to a Decent Burial

Contract law provides an action for breach of contract relating to the care and burial of a corpse under certain circumstances.73 For example, plaintiffs recovered damages for breach
of contract when a train74 and plane75 failed to timely transport
a loved one’s remains, an undertaker failed to embalm and perform funeral services properly,76 and a telegraph company failed
to promptly notify the decedent’s family of the decedent’s
passing.77
Federal courts may find that an airline breached a contract to
take care of a corpse, an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing,78 or a contractual duty. Airlines enter “contracts of carriage” with future passengers upon each ticket sale.79 Generally,
airlines may breach contracts of carriage by losing, damaging, or
delaying a passenger’s checked baggage, carry-on baggage, or
See Cantu, supra note 65, at 461–63.
See, e.g., Guth, 28 P.3d at 988 (citing Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co.,
261 Cal. Rptr. 769, 774 (Ct. App. 1989)).
71 See, e.g., Guth, 28 P.3d at 988.
72 See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tex. 1993).
73 Hale v. Bonner, 17 S.W. 605, 605–06 (Tex. 1891); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.
of Tex. v. Linton, 109 S.W. 942, 942–43 (Tex. App. 1908).
74 See Hale, 17 S.W. at 605–06; Linton, 109 S.W. at 942–43.
75 See Tarar v. Pak. Int’l Airlines, 554 F. Supp. 471, 474 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (applying Texas law).
76 See Pat H. Foley & Co. v. Wyatt, 442 S.W.2d 904, 906–07 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Clark v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d 192, 197 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
77 See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Shaw, 177 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. 1944) (stating damages for telegraph company ascertained by breach of contract rules).
78 Texas contract law does not imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in every contract; however, it recognizes that such a duty may arise from a special
relationship between the contracting parties. See, e.g., Manges v. Guerra, 673
S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984).
79 DELTA, DOMESTIC GENERAL RULES TARRIFF 15 (2021), www.delta.com/us/
en/legal/contract-of-carriage-dgr/#17ba [https://perma.cc/ZW5S-2E7Y].
69
70
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personal property offered to the airline.80 Some contracts of carriage may include additional language explicitly relating to the
shipment of a corpse. For example, airlines may contract to take
“serious . . . care” when handling human remains,81 act with
“sensitivity,”82 or consider a corpse the flight’s “most precious
cargo.”83 Ultimately, an airline’s failure to satisfy a contract term
constitutes a breach because the “airline dishonored a term the
airline itself stipulated.”84
The Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the ADA’s preemptive scope allows some state contract law claims to survive
preemption. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, the Court distinguished “self-imposed” contractual obligations from state-imposed obligations, allowing courts to enforce state contract law
claims that an airline voluntarily undertakes.85 Most recently, in
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, the ADA preempted common law
claims, which included a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.86 Because the state incorporated the covenant into every contract, the state imposed the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.87 The Wolens exception
for state contract law claims allows contract-based claims to proceed under the ADA where the same tort-based theories fail.88
Part III discusses the Court’s precedents in greater detail.89
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) liability
limits on property damage incurred on domestic flights may cap
the success of contract-based claims arising from an airline’s
mishandling of human remains. DOT limits an airline’s liability
for property damage incurred on domestic flights to $3,800.90
The damage or loss must be “proven,” and the value of reimbursement is limited to “the documented original purchase
Id.
See American Airlines Cargo: TLC, AM. AIRLINES, https://www.aacargo.com/
learn/humanremains.html [https://perma.cc/7UX9-SR92].
82 See id.
83 See Specialized Care, DELTA, https://www.deltacargo.com/Cargo/catalog/
products/specialized-care [https://perma.cc/T4W7-GV7Y].
84 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232–33 (1995).
85 See id. at 228–29.
86 See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 286–88 (2014).
87 See id.
88 See cases cited infra notes 172–173.
89 See infra Part III.
90 Lost, Delayed, or Damaged Baggage, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://
www.transportation.gov/lost-delayed-or-damaged-baggage [https://perma.cc/
4FED-4947] (May 27, 2021).
80
81
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price less any applicable depreciation for prior usage.”91 This
language arguably may preclude damages for mishandling or
losing human remains whose value is never reflected in an original purchase price or depreciated by “prior usage.” Human remains possess an intrinsic value—not a commercial value—and
cannot be bought and sold like other goods.92
B.

THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC:

A

PERFECT STORM

The COVID-19 pandemic plagues Americans. To date, more
than 1 million Americans have died of COVID-19.93 The CDC’s
data indicate that 385,443 Americans died due to COVID-19 in
2020, and 446,197 Americans did so in 2021.94 Arguably, the volatility of the airline industry is the virus’s second most noticeable
calamity. COVID-19 also overwhelmed the aviation industry, hitting commercial airlines especially hard.95 Global airline revenues fell 55% in 2020,96 commercial aircraft manufacturers
incurred $12 billion in losses,97 and the number of passengers
fell by 2.703 billion.98 Where these two effects—death and volatile/unreliable air travel—intersect, a perfect storm threatens to
result in an airline mishandling, delaying, or losing a loved
one’s remains en route to a final disposition. The COVID-19
pandemic thus emphasizes the need for courts to revisit and reinterpret the ADA’s preemption clause.
First, commercial airlines suffer persistent staff shortages.99
Roughly 400,000 commercial airline workers have been “fired,
furloughed, or told they may lose their jobs due to [COVID19].”100 The industry-wide pilot shortage and the pandemic’s layDELTA, supra note 79, at 15.
Cf. Onyeanusi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 952 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir.
1992) (arguing that human remains have significant commercial value because
medical schools and hospitals commonly use cadavers and because parts of the
human body can be sold).
93 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 27.
94 See id.; Mizan, supra note 28.
95 BOUWER ET AL., supra note 29, at 6.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 ICAO, supra note 32, at 5.
99 Lori Aratani & Ian Duncan, 28,000 Canceled Flights Later, Airlines Still Looking
for Upper Hand Against Omicron, Weather, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2022/01/08/airline-flight-delays-cancellations/ [https://perma.cc/GVA6-RALF] (Jan. 8, 2022, 11:22 AM).
100 Jack Kelly, Airlines Lost Over 400,000 Workers—United Airlines Announced Another 14,000 Jobs May Be Lost, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2021, 10:57 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2021/02/01/airlines-lost-over-40000-workers91
92
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offs caused flight delays and cancellations in summer 2022.101
These diminished staff numbers are reduced further by regular
sick leave. The Omicron variant caused U.S.-based commercial
airlines to cancel over 20,000 flights and delay 2,300 flights between Christmas Eve, 2021, and the first week of January
2022.102 Delta—an airline that carries 3,000 to 4,000 corpses
across the United States every month103—canceled the most
flights on Christmas.104 Delta canceled 309 flights, United canceled 240 flights, JetBlue canceled 123 flights, and American
Airlines canceled 92 flights.105 On Thursday, December 23,
Delta stated, “Delta teams have exhausted all options and resources – including rerouting and substitutions of aircraft and
crews to cover scheduled flying.”106 Other airlines, including
Southwest, United, and JetBlue, offered pilots and crews extra
pay throughout January to fill in for sick staff.107 Overall, the
percentage of delayed flights108 skyrocketed in 2022, from
roughly 11.44% of flights delayed in 2021 to 20.12% of flights
delayed in 2022.109
Persistent staff shortages foreshadow more delayed or lost
baggage. Airports in the United States do not own or operate
united-airlines-announced-another-14000-jobs-may-be-lost/?sh=64da488c24b3
[https://perma.cc/K945-B8FS].
101 Geoff Whitmore, What’s Causing Flight Delays and Cancellations?, FORBES
(June 22, 2022, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/geoffwhitmore/2022/
06/22/whats-causing-flight-delays-and-cancellations/?sh=1f9aab574873 [https://
perma.cc/X4BC-AN9H].
102 Leslie Josephs, Airlines Cancel Another 1,400 Flights as Omicron, Severe Weather
Continue to Snarl Travel, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/04/airlines-cancel-hundreds-of-flights-from-omicron-weather.html [https://perma.cc/BTY8WJLZ] (Jan. 4, 2022, 4:38 PM).
103 Sue Ann Pressley, Airlines Do Booming Business Moving Corpses, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 23, 2002, 12:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-200204-23-0204230004-story.html/ [https://perma.cc/3VDE-B8ZW].
104 Tori B. Powell, Hundreds More U.S. Flights Canceled on Christmas Day Due to
Omicron Spread, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/united-delta-cancelholiday-flights-omicron-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/97GH-8HND] (Dec. 25,
2021, 6:51 PM).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Josephs, supra note 102.
108 These statistics consider a flight delayed “if it arrived at (or departed) the
gate 15 minutes or more after the scheduled arrival (departure) time.” On-Time
Performance - Reporting Operating Carrier Flight Delays at a Glance, BUREAU OF TRANSP.
STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transtats.bts.gov/HomeDrillChart.asp
[https://perma.cc/G8TQ-4HUU].
109 Id.
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their baggage-handling systems—rather, the airlines do.110 Each
airline operates its baggage-handling system differently. Some
airlines operate independently, some airlines operate with thirdparty assistance, and some airlines share baggage-handling responsibilities.111 The fractured baggage-handling system creates
inefficiencies that result in damaged, delayed, or lost baggage.112
Airports in other parts of the world “lease” baggage-handling
operations to third parties, who conduct baggage handling for
all the airport’s airlines.113 Thus, staff shortages affect the baggage-handling system’s efficiency and accuracy more in the
United States than elsewhere.114
Second, COVID-19 minimized consumer choice in commercial air carriers. The aviation industry is “especially vulnerable to
external shocks beyond [its] control,” including events such as
9/11, the 2008 global financial crisis, and COVID-19.115 Smaller,
regional commercial air carriers often fold when demand
shrinks while major commercial air carriers remain intact.116
With fewer options for air transportation, consumers grapple
with major commercial air carriers that maintain litigationtested policies, unresponsive bureaucracies, and effective intimidation tactics.117
110 Mishandled Baggage: Problems and Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 23 (2006), https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg28283/html/CHRG109hhrg28283.htm [https://perma.cc/BZ6Q-M536].
111 See Ashton Kang, Delta Introduces Innovative Baggage Tracking Process, DELTA
NEWS HUB (Apr. 28, 2016, 7:00 PM), https://news.delta.com/delta-introducesinnovative-baggage-tracking-process [https://perma.cc/L6B9-DFJ8]; About Us,
SITA, https://www.sita.aero/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/N688-AQVR]; Airport
Baggage Handling Systems Market Size, Share, Trends by 2027, MKT. RSCH. FUTURE
(Apr. 2018), https://www.marketresearchfuture.com/reports/commercial-airport-baggage-handling-systems-market-1269 [https://perma.cc/AR5Q-HVTW].
112 See 109th Cong., supra note 110.
113 Cf. Jodi Richards, San Francisco Int’l Installs First Tote-Based Baggage System in
U.S., AIRPORT IMPROVEMENT (Sept. 2020), https://airportimprovement.com/article/san-francisco-int-l-installs-first-tote-based-baggage-system-us [https://
perma.cc/M7TT-75E5].
114 Cf. id.
115 BOUWER ET AL., supra note 29, at 6.
116 See Thomas Pallini, The Pandemic Devastated Airlines in 2020 and Forced Many
out of Business—Here’s the Most Notable That Didn’t Make It to 2021, BUS. INSIDER
(Jan. 17, 2021, 7:28 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/airlines-that-wentout-of-business-in-2020-2021-1 [https://perma.cc/B6TZ-X2BW].
117 See generally Air Travel Consumer Report: Consumer Complaints Against Airlines
Rise More than 300 Percent Above Pre-Pandemic Levels, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (June,
23, 2022), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/air-travel-consumer-report-consumer-complaints-against-airlines-rise-more-300-percent [https://
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External shocks such as COVID-19 accelerate the consolidation of commercial air carriers into the dominant few.118 Deregulation of the aviation industry already adversely affects the
number of commercial air carriers available.119 The former
American Airlines Chairman once acknowledged,
The consequences [of deregulation] have been very adverse. Our
airlines, once world leaders, are now laggards in every category,
including fleet age, service quality and international reputation.
Fewer and fewer flights are on time . . . . An even higher percentage of bags are lost or misplaced . . . . Airline service, by any
standard, has become unacceptable.120

The commercial air carrier oligopoly grows stronger with
each economic downturn. Ultimately, minimized consumer
choice only maximizes the remaining commercial air carriers’
ability to withstand any financial or reputational harm resulting
from litigation arising from the mishandling of a loved one’s
remains.
Third, commercial air carriers increased cargo shipping to
subsidize passenger transportation during COVID-19. As
COVID-19 clogged supply chains, demand for cargo air carriers
went up 10% through July 2020 compared to July 2019.121 Commercial air carriers responded to market needs to stave off bankruptcy.122 For example, United Airlines shipped vital medical
supplies on its 777 and 787 planes; Delta Airlines converted passenger planes to cargo planes; American Airlines scheduled its
first cargo-only flights since 1984.123 Commercial air carriers acperma.cc/7ZLQ-SZDW]; see also, e.g., Kathryn B. Creedy, Why Airlines Are Cracking
Down on “Skiplagging”—the Hack That Savvy Travellers Use to Fly for Less, BBC WORKLIFE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20190226-thetravel-trick-that-airlines-hate [https://perma.cc/6YCR-BFE3].
118 See Airline Deregulation: When Everything Changed, SMITHSONIAN, NAT’L AIR &
SPACE MUSEUM (Dec. 17, 2021), https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/airline-deregulation-when-everything-changed [https://perma.cc/C6LY-XMHT]
(explaining that recession in the early 1980s led to a wave of mergers between
larger, more stable airlines and smaller, newer airlines).
119 Id.
120 Sumit Singh, How the Airline Deregulation Act Shook Up U.S. Aviation, SIMPLE
FLYING (July 31, 2020), https://simpleflying.com/airline-deregulation-unitedstates/ [https://perma.cc/5C3Y-J5MZ].
121 BOUWER ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
122 See id.
123 Kyunghee Park, Medicine, Phones and Strawberries: As Passengers Drop 90%,
Desperate Airlines Convert to Cargo to Stay Afloat, FORTUNE: INT’L (Mar. 26, 2020, 6:40
AM), https://fortune.com/2020/03/26/passengers-drop-desperate-airlinescargo-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/82ZB-JVFC].
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cepted a renewed responsibility for shipping greater quantities
of precious cargo. Yet, DOT limits an airline’s liability for lost,
damaged, or delayed bags on a domestic flight to $3,800—regardless of the bag’s contents—and grants the airline discretion
to pay more than the limit.124
COVID-19’s numerous effects on commercial air carriers
heighten the potential for grave injustice regarding an airline’s
transport of a loved one’s remains. Part III explains how the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the ADA
insulates commercial air carriers from liability for state law
claims.
III.

THE PREEMPTION PROBLEM: FEDERAL LAW
VERSUS STATE LAW

The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause establishes the concept
of preemption.125 Article VI states, “[The] Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”126 The
Supremacy Clause preempts contrary or inconsistent state law;
however, state law controls in the absence of directly contrary
federal law.127 As federal legislation, the ADA preempts contrary
or inconsistent state aviation regulations.128 This Comment provides a brief historical overview of U.S. aviation law to contextualize the Supreme Court’s cases defining the ADA’s preemptive
scope.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT’S GUIDANCE: LIMITING STATE LAW
REMEDIES

Modern air transportation took off at the turn of the twentieth century when Orville Wright completed the first sustained,
powered flight in 1903.129 The need for a regulatory regime governing commercial aviation became increasingly apparent as
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 90.
Supremacy Clause, MERRIAM-WEBSTER LEGAL, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/supremacy%20clause [https://perma.cc/V49S-947T].
126 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
127 See id.
128 Eric E. Murphy, Federal Preemption of State Law Relating to an Air Carrier’s Services, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1200–04 (2004).
129 A Brief History of the FAA, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/about/history/
brief_history [https://perma.cc/LUQ3-2AUF].
124
125
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flight technology progressed.130 Congress passed the Air Commerce Act of 1926, which vested regulatory authority in four distinct entities, including the states.131 Shortly after, Congress
passed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.132 Rather than dividing
authority over navigable airspace, the Act vested sole government agency authority in the Civil Aeronautics Authority, which
later became the CAB.133 The Act also included a “savings
clause”: “Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge
or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such
remedies.”134
Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to create the
Federal Aviation Agency, which later became the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).135 The Federal Aviation Agency primarily functioned “to provide for the regulation” and “safe and
efficient use of the airspace,” and “[to] promot[e] . . . civil aviation.”136 Notably, the Act left the previous savings clause undisturbed: “Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute.”137 The savings clause allowed states to regulate intrastate airfares and enforce state laws against deceptive trade
practices.138
As inflation rose and oil prices skyrocketed, Congress deregulated the aviation industry to encourage “competitive market
forces”; promote “efficiency, innovation, and low prices”; and
provide “variety [and] quality . . . of air transportation serJohn McDermott, The History of Airline (De)Regulation in the United States, AER(June 26, 2017), https://aeronauticsonline.com/the-history-of-airlinederegulation-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQY-FFLK] (noting the
first piece of aviation legislation, the Air Mail Act of 1925, did not involve commercial aviation; the Air Mail Act made air mail routes independent of the U.S.
Post Office for a maximum of four years).
131 See Matthew J. Kelly, Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978:
How Do State Tort Claims Fare, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 873, 876 (2000); see also Air
Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344; William Zink, The Political Motivation of Aviation
Deregulation, 8 J. AVIATION/AEROSPACE EDUC. & RSCH. 19, 19 (1999).
132 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 706, § 1107, 52 Stat. 973, 1027.
133 Kelly, supra note 131, at 876.
134 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 706, § 1106, 52 Stat. 973.
135 Kelly, supra note 131, at 876; see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
136 Federal Aviation Act pmbl.
137 Dempsey, supra note 15, at 438 (quoting Federal Aviation Act § 1106).
138 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
130

ONAUTICS

818

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

vices.”139 The ADA saved the aviation industry from the inefficiencies of government regulation by rejecting the prior dual
administrative system that allowed states to regulate intrastate
airfare and the CAB to regulate interstate airfare.140 The ADA
rid the states of regulatory oversight power by prohibiting any
state from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law, rule, regulation,
standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law
relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.”141 The
preemption clause effectively prevented states from reimposing
regulations.142 The ADA also preserved the savings clause, reiterating that current state common law and statutory remedies
shall not be “abridge[d] or alter[ed].”143 The Supreme Court
struggled to define the preemption clause and the savings clause
in a way that allowed the provisions to coexist meaningfully. The
Court’s three cases grant the aviation industry considerable freedom to establish its own rule of law via private contractual
agreements.144
1.

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, holding that the ADA preempted the
National Association of Attorneys General’s (NAAG’s) regulation of airline advertisements’ content and format.145 The Court
used the ordinary meaning of the ADA’s language to distill the
statute’s legislative purpose.146 The crux of any ADA preemption
case is whether a state law claim “relat[es] to [the] rates, routes,
or services of any air carrier”; thus, the Court analyzed the
phrase “relating to.”147 First, the Court noted that Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “relating to” as “to stand in some relation; to
have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into associaId. (quoting Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 102(a),
92 Stat. 1705, 1706–07).
140 See Zink, supra note 131, at 20; McDermott, supra note 130; Morales, 504 U.S.
at 378.
141 Airline Deregulation Act § 105(a)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1978).
142 See id.; Morales, 504 U.S. at 378–79; Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 190–91 (3d Cir. 1998).
143 See 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1958).
144 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383; Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228
(1995); Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 276 (2014); Konnoth, supra note 25,
at 1945.
145 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 391.
146 Id. at 383.
147 See id.
139

2022]

INHUMANE: HOW THE AIRLINE

819

tion with or connection with.”148 Second, the Court’s analysis of
“relating to” in Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) litigation recognized the phrase’s “broad
scope,”149 “expansive sweep,”150 and “conspicuous . . .
breadth.”151 The Court concluded that the ADA preempted
state law claims with a “connection with” or “reference to” airline “rates, routes, or services.”152
The Court dismissed the Petitioner’s arguments about narrowing the ADA’s preemptive scope.153 Petitioner argued the
Court’s reliance on ERISA litigation overlooked critical differences between the statutes.154 For example, ERISA was a comprehensive scheme, unlike the ADA.155 The ADA also included a
general savings clause, preserving common law and statutory
remedies.156 The Court was unpersuaded. First, ERISA cases
“clearly and unmistakably rely on express pre-emption principles and a construction of the phrase ‘relates to.’”157 Second,
well-established statutory-interpretation rules assert “that the
specific governs the general.”158 Because the general savings
clause existed pre-preemption, the savings clause does not “supersede the specific substantive pre-emption provision.”159 Petitioner also argued that pre-emption “is inappropriate when state
and federal laws are consistent.”160 The Court again relied on
ERISA precedents—preemption displaces all state laws that fall
within the statute’s sphere, even consistent state laws.161 Only
state law claims with a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” relationship to an airline’s services survive preemption.162 Justice Stevens’s dissent objected to the Court’s reliance on ERISA’s
Id. (quoting Relating to, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)).
Id. at 384 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739
(1985)).
150 Id. (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987)).
151 Id. (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990)).
152 Id. at 384.
153 Id. at 384–87.
154 Id. at 384.
155 Id. at 384–85.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 384.
158 Id. at 384–85 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.
437, 445 (1987)).
159 Id. at 385.
160 Id. at 386.
161 Id. at 386–87.
162 Id. at 390 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21
(1983)).
148
149
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“virtually unique pre-emption provision” and disregard for the
ADA’s language, structure, and history.163 According to Stevens,
nothing in the ADA’s language, structure, or history suggested
Congress intended to preempt common law tort or contract
claims.164
Although the Court “expansively” and “broadly” interpreted
the ADA’s preemption clause based on the definition of “relating to,”165 the Court did not discuss the phrase’s limits. A limitless number of state law claims arising from an air carrier’s
activity could “connect with” that airline’s rates, routes, or services. Lower courts have found state laws “relating to” an airline’s rates, routes, or services preempted in two circumstances
based on Morales: (1) where the law expressly references an air
carrier’s rates, routes, or services, or (2) where the law creates a
“forbidden significant effect” on an air carrier’s rates, routes, or
services.166 The Court added to the confusion three years later
in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens.
2.

American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens

Respondents filed two state law claims in Wolens: a consumer
fraud claim and a breach of contract claim.167 The Court distinguished the claims.168 The consumer fraud claim served to
“guide and police the marketing practices of the airlines,” which
the ADA reserved for the airlines.169 Morales preempted “intrusive [state] regulation” on an airline’s business practices.170 In
contrast, the breach of contract claim did not involve a stateimposed obligation—an airline’s “self-imposed undertaking[ ]”
does not amount to “a State’s ‘enact[ment] or enforce[ment]
[of] any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law.’”171 The Wolens exception allows
obligations voluntarily undertaken by the airline and enforced
by state law to survive preemption; however, contract law princi163 Id. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of California
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. California, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26
(1983)).
164 Id. at 420.
165 See supra notes 146–162 and accompanying text.
166 See Murphy, supra note 128, at 1200–03, 1201 n.28.
167 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 224–25 (1995).
168 Id. at 226–27.
169 Id. at 228.
170 Id. at 227–28 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 392).
171 Id. at 228–29. (quoting brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, id. at 9
(No. 93-1286)).
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ples that “effectuate the State’s public policies, rather than the
intent of the parties,” are still preempted.172 The state’s public
policies enlarged the parties’ obligations beyond the contract’s
scope.173 Confused lower courts enforced Morales and Wolens
inconsistently.174
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence acknowledged the confusion
Wolens created. She asserted that Morales and Wolens illustrate
the same issue and thus should result in the same outcome—
preemption of all state law claims.175 Morales’ advertising guidelines and Wolens’s frequent-flyer contract related to airline rates
and services.176 Neither Morales’ advertising guidelines nor
Wolens’s frequent-flyer contract maintained “legal force, except
insofar as a generally applicable state law (a consumer fraud law
in Morales, [and] state contract law [in Wolens]) permit[ted] an
aggrieved party to invoke the State’s coercive power” to force
compliance.177 Lastly, lower courts preempt state contract law
under the ADA when the subject matter “relates” to an airline’s
rates, routes, or services.178 Justice O’Connor distinguished
some state personal injury claims that may too tenuously “relate”
to an airline’s rates, routes, and services to be preempted.179 To
support her claim, Justice O’Connor cited the Fifth Circuit’s
Hodges opinion, which held that an airline’s “services” and an
airline’s “safety” are not coextensive and thus safety-related tort
claims survive preemption.180 Section III.B elaborates on Hodges.
3.

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg held the ADA preempted Respondent’s breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
172 Id. at 233 n.8 (quoting brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, id. at 28
(No. 93-1286)).
173 Id. at 233.
174 See Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 258–59 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the ADA preempted the breach of contract claim because the airline raised
federal defenses and adjudication of the claim required reference to law and
policies external to the parties’ bargain); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d
745, 755 (Tex. 2003) (holding that the ADA preempted the breach of contract
claim because, although the contract incorporated DOT regulations, the plaintiff
sought “to enlarge [the airline’s] obligations” and “modify the contract terms”).
175 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 239–41 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 240.
177 Id. at 240–41.
178 Id. at 241–42.
179 Id. at 242–43.
180 Id. at 242.
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claim.181 The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the
ADA’s preemption clause only applied to state-enacted legislation and regulations and concluded the ADA’s preemption
clause also applied to state common law rules.182 Common law
rules have “the force and effect of law.”183 The Court also rejected the respondent’s argument that the ADA’s savings clause
preserved common law claims based on the Court’s interpretation of the savings clause in the Boat Safety Act.184 Distinguishing between the Boat Safety Act and the ADA, the Court
reasoned that because the ADA’s savings clause was a “relic” of
pre-preemption, the clause applied generally.185 General remedies clauses cannot supersede specific, substantive preemption
clauses.186
The Court supported its holding with another discussion of
the ADA’s purpose.187 Essentially, Congress enacted the ADA assuming market forces, not government regulation, effectively
promoted an airline passenger’s “best interests.”188 Airlines that
“mistreat[ ]” passengers suffer enough reputational harm to
force change because passengers can choose a “more favorable
rival” in the free market.189 As Section II.B discussed, the Court
erroneously assumes that mistreated passengers can choose between commercial air carriers—service to regional airports190
and commercial air carrier numbers191 decline with each external shock.192 The Court also assumes that consumers and commercial air carriers possess equal bargaining power.193
See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 281 (2014).
Id. at 281–82.
183 Id. at 282.
184 Id. at 282–83.
185 Id. at 283.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 288.
189 Id.
190 See Taylor Rains, Some of the Most Remote Areas in the US Are Losing an Air
Service Link to the Rest of the Country, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2021, 07:33 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/small-communities-are-losing-air-service-restthe-country-2021-11 [https://perma.cc/8VHN-Z846].
191 See Pallini, supra note 116.
192 See David Koenig & Scott Mayerowitz, Airlines Carve US into Markets Dominated by 1 or 2 Carriers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 14, 2015), https://apnews.com/
article/7f964b3e484d4b43b732424dd9df0975 [https://perma.cc/G5HQ-RW96]
193 Cf. id. (reporting that in “40 of the 100 largest U.S. airports, a single airline
controls a majority of the market,” and “[a]t 93 of the top 100, one or two airlines
control a majority of the seats,” leaving a distinct lack of alternative choices—and
thus a lack of bargaining power—for mistreated consumers).
181
182
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Lower courts struggle to apply the Court’s three cases, leading
to inconsistent results. For example, one court held the ADA
preempted breach of contract claims arising from an airline’s
decision to board a passenger;194 however, another court held
the ADA did not preempt tort claims arising from an airline’s
decision to refuse to board a passenger.195 One court held the
ADA preempted state law claims arising from an airline losing
luggage;196 another court held that the ADA did not preempt
state law claims arising from an airline tampering with luggage.197 One court held the ADA preempted state law claims
arising from an airline’s decision to “bump[ ]” passengers from
an overbooked flight;198 another court held the ADA did not
preempt state law claims arising from an airline’s removal of a
passenger from a flight.199 The precedents regarding the ADA’s
preemptive scope create inconsistencies.
B.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S UNDERSTANDING: HODGES V. DELTA
AIRLINES, INC.

The Fifth Circuit’s seminal case broadly interpreting the ADA
defines the term “service” as all bargained-for elements of air
carrier service, including “ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to
the transportation itself.”200 The CAB’s statements implementing the ADA supported the Fifth Circuit’s definition:
“[P]reemption extends to all of the economic factors that go
into the provision of the quid pro quo for [a] passenger’s . . . fare,
including flight frequency and timing, liability limits, reservation and boarding practices, insurance, smoking rules, meal service, entertainment, [and] bonding and corporate financing.”201
Additionally, the statements emphasized that the ADA’s sole concern was economic deregulation, not displacing state tort law.202
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that Hodges did not insulate
commercial air carriers from all state tort claims for personal
See Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 258 (4th Cir. 1998).
See Atl. Coast Airlines v. Cook, 857 N.E.2d 989, 994 (Ind. 2006).
196 See Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2002).
197 See Lynn v. Invitae Corp., 466 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1043–45 (D. Ariz. 2020).
198 See Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, 309 F. App’x. 483, 485 (2d Cir. 2009).
199 See Makhzoomi v. Sw. Airlines Co., 419 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1156 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
200 Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d en banc,
44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995).
201 Id. at 354–55 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 9,948, 9,951 (Feb. 15, 1979)).
202 Id. at 354.
194
195
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injury.203 First, DOT requires commercial air carriers to maintain insurance “for bodily injury to or death of a person, or for
damage to property of others, resulting from the carrier’s operation or maintenance of the aircraft.”204 DOT’s insurance requirement supports a distinction between an airline’s “services”
and “operation or maintenance.”205 Second, because the ADA
incorporated the savings clauses found in the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the court
could not “assume that Congress meant completely to undermine” the clause’s preservation of existing common law and statutory remedies.206 Third, tort law does not “express[ly]
reference” an airline’s services; thus, the enforcement of tort duties will not have “the forbidden significant effect” on airline
services.207
Though Hodges supports its definition of services with language in DOT’s insurance requirement, Hodges creates a false
dichotomy between an airline’s “services” and “operation or
maintenance.” Hodges only provides limited guidance on the
meaning of “services” by illustrating examples of preempted
cases. First, the ADA does not preempt state law claims arising
from the negligent operation of overhead storage bins—i.e., the
fact pattern in Hodges.208 An airline’s operation of overhead storage bins relates to an airline’s safety, not services.209 Second, the
ADA preempts state law claims arising from an airline’s wrongful exclusion or eviction.210 Enforcing such state law claims
would result in “significant de facto regulation of the airlines’
boarding practices” and would interfere with federal regulations
granting the airlines considerable discretion in the matter.211
Third, the ADA preempts state law claims arising from an airline’s decision to “bump[ ]” a passenger from an overbooked

Id. at 355.
Id. (quoting 14 C.F.R. §205.5(a) (1992)).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 356 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388
(1992)).
208 See id. at 351.
209 See id. at 356.
210 See id. (citing O’Carroll v. Am. Air Lines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11, 12 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106).
211 See id. (citing O’Carroll, 863 F.2d at 12).
203
204
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flight.212 Hodges indicates that state law claims involving boarding procedures do not survive preemption.213
A recent district court decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
expanded other aspects of Hodges’ definition of “service,” including “baggage handling” and “the transportation” of passengers
and cargo.214 The court held the ADA preempts a tortious interference claim arising from an airline’s refusal to ship Big Five
hunting trophies (trophies of “lions, leopards, elephants, rhinoceroses, and buffalo”).215 The airline’s decision to cease shipments of the trophies “merely altered the scope of its
services.”216 Relying on Hodges, the court found that “baggage
handling” involves an airline’s baggage and boarding policies
and thus remains within the airline’s domain.217 Against these
precedents, this Comment argues that courts should interpret
the ADA’s preemption clause more narrowly based on the plain
meaning of the ADA’s purpose, the ADA’s text, stare decisis,
and the law’s treatment of other entities that mishandle human
remains.
IV.
A.

THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF A MORE HUMANE
AVIATION INDUSTRY
THE ACT’S PURPOSE: ECONOMIC DEREGULATION ONLY

Courts rely on two cornerstones when determining whether
federal law preempts state law.218 First, Congress’s purpose is the
“ultimate touchstone.”219 A statute’s purpose regarding preemption may be explicitly stated or implicitly contained in its structure.220 Second, “the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act” controls unless Congress “clear[ly]” and “manifest[ly]” legislated
with a contrary purpose.221 Both cornerstones favor a narrowly
interpreted preemption clause, despite the Court’s precedents.
See id.
See id.
214 See Conservation Force v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 606, 613
(N.D. Tex. 2016), aff’d, 682 F. App’x 310 (5th Cir. 2017).
215 Id. at 608, 613–14.
216 Id. at 613.
217 See id. (quoting Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336).
218 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
219 Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
220 See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
221 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485).
212
213
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Courts accurately recognize the ADA’s purpose throughout
their precedents: “[P]lacing maximum reliance on competitive
market forces”222 and improving “the variety and quality of . . .
air transportation services.”223 The Court in Morales and Wolens
cited Congress’s explicitly stated objectives.224 The Fifth Circuit
has stated Congress enacted the ADA to preempt solely economic regulations, not tort law,225 and the court has acknowledged that the savings clause “preserv[ed] the clearly
established federal common law [in some areas].”226 Ginsberg reiterated that the Act deregulated the aviation industry so the
market could determine rates, routes, and services.227 Congress
included the preemption clause to prevent states from reimposing economic regulations and undoing what the Act may accomplish.228 Despite the courts’ overwhelming recognition that
Congress enacted the ADA and included the preemption clause
to ensure economic efficiency—and not to disturb state tort and
contract laws—the courts’ imprecise language expands the
ADA’s preemptive scope beyond what Congress intended.
Federalism principles counsel courts to avoid interpreting
federal statutes to preempt state statutes without Congress
clearly and manifestly intending the result.229 Justice Stevens’s
Morales dissent cautioned courts to cabin the ADA’s preemptive
scope because the Act’s plain language only “pre-empts . . . state
law[s] that relate[ ] directly to rates, routes, or services.”230 The
ADA should not preempt traditional state regulations that “might
have some indirect connection” to an airline’s rates, routes, and
services without more evidence.231 No evidence clearly and manifestly shows that Congress intended to preempt state tort and
contract law claims; only evidence to the contrary exists.232 ConSee 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6).
Id. § 40101(a)(12)(B).
224 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 230 (1995) (citing Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992)).
225 See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d en
banc, 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995).
226 See Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 928 (1997)).
227 See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 283 (2014) (citing Morales, 504 U.S.
at 378).
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
230 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 421. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231 Id.
232 See id. at 423–24.
222
223
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gress preserved the savings clause from prior aviation law to protect certain existing common law and statutory remedies.233
Courts addressing the ADA’s preemptive scope minimize the
savings clause’s importance and assume that the preemption
clause more clearly reflects Congress’s purpose. Morales downplayed the ADA’s savings clause from the beginning by labeling
it a “relic” of aviation law before preemption.234 The unanimous
Ginsberg opinion repeated the quote.235 The Court’s attitude toward the savings clause resulted in the preemption clause eclipsing the savings clause. Legal scholars argue the ADA “supernova
has . . . emasculated [the savings clause]” and far surpassed any
Congressional effort to “circumscribe states’ ability to regulate
intrastate airline entry and pricing.”236 The savings clause explicitly provides that “nothing contained in this chapter shall . . .
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute.”237 Courts undermine the savings clause by using the
clause’s presence in prior aviation laws as an indication that the
clause is “general” and thus does not supersede the Act’s “specific” preemption clause.238 The assumption defies the statute’s
explicit text by rejecting the statute’s stated purpose and rendering the savings clause meaningless.
B.

PLAIN MEANING: IT IS WHAT IT IS

The statute’s plain meaning supports the assertion that the
ADA does not preempt state law claims for mishandling human
remains. Hodges defines “service” as all bargained-for elements
of an air carrier service, including “ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in
addition to the transportation itself.”239 A state law claim arising
from the mishandling of human remains could only reasonably
See id. at 423.
See id. at 385 (majority opinion) (“[T]he ‘saving’ clause is a relic of the preADA/no pre-emption regime.”).
235 See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 283 (2014) (quoting Morales, 504
U.S. at 385).
236 Dempsey, supra note 15, at 445.
237 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1958) (emphasis added).
238 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 385 (quoting Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 494 (1987) (“[W]e do not believe Congress intended to undermine this
carefully drawn statute through a general saving[s] clause.”)).
239 Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d en banc,
44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995).
233
234
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be considered “baggage handling” or “transportation itself.”240
Based on the plain meaning of “service” and “baggage handling,” the ADA should not preempt a claim arising from the
mishandling of human remains.
An airline’s “service” does not include its “transportation.” An
entity can provide service and not transportation and vice versa.
Merriam-Webster defines “service” as “the work performed by
one that serves” or “a helpful act.”241 Merriam-Webster defines
“transportation” as a “means of conveyance or travel.”242 An airline’s services require employees to “perform acts” and “serve,”
while transportation refers to the “means of conveyance” itself—
i.e., the airplane. Hodges acknowledges the difference between
an airline’s services, like “ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling,” and the “transportation itself” by using the phrase “in addition to” to add to an
already-enumerated list of services.243 Essentially, Hodges holds
that the term “service” means “services” and “transportation.”
“Service” and “transportation” must mean two different things
for courts to except safety-related tort claims from preemption.244 For example, federal courts in Texas allow state tort
claims arising from airplane crashes for defective designs245 and
in-flight injuries246 to proceed. These state tort claims survive
preemption because the “means of conveyance”—or the transportation—was unsafe. An airline’s transportation is more analogous to an airline’s operation and maintenance, which does
not “relate to” an airline’s rates, routes, or service. Claims arising
from the mishandling of human remains are also not covered by
an airline’s “baggage handling.”
240 See Conservation Force v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608,
613–14 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (preempting state tort claims arising from an airline’s
refusal to ship Big Five Trophy hunting trophies because the claims related to
“baggage handling” and “transportation itself”).
241 Service, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
service [https://perma.cc/WL4F-HNYZ].
242 Transportation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transportation [https://perma.cc/67G5-4H5Z].
243 Hodges, 4 F.3d at 354.
244 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 242 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
245 See, e.g., Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 826–27, 830,
837 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
246 See Skidmore v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. Civ.A.399CV2958G, 2000 WL
1844675, at *1–3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2000).
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Merriam-Webster defines “baggage” as “suitcases, trunks, and
personal belongings of travelers.”247 First, human remains cannot be transported in suitcases or trunks.248 Each airline sets out
extensive packaging requirements for cremated and noncremated remains.249 Second, property law principles preclude
human remains from being considered a traveler’s “personal belongings.”250 The quasi-property right granted to a decedent’s
next of kin does not include the right to “possess” the body.251
Third, a traveler’s personal belongings include items traveling
with the passenger,252 which does not adequately describe the
relationship between a decedent’s remains and a decedent’s
next of kin. A decedent’s next of kin does not necessarily travel
with the decedent’s remains.253
C.

STARE DECISIS: IN FAVOR

OF A

NEW PRECEDENT

Stare decisis prevents judges from abandoning legal precedent when presented with an argument previously resolved by
another court of binding authority.254 The doctrine fosters stability by “promot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on
judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived integrity” of the judiciary.255 Stare decisis does not result
247 Baggage,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/baggage [https://perma.cc/F6PJ-NCT7].
248 See, e.g., Human Remains, AM. AIRLINES, https://www.aacargo.com/learn/
humanremains.html [https://perma.cc/BQS3-HTWM].
249 See
id.; Specialized Care: Funeral Shipments, DELTA, https://
www.deltacargo.com/Cargo/catalog/products/specialized-care [https://
perma.cc/5SLY-2EQQ].
250 See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
251 See BERNARD, supra note 47, at 13 (observing that property rights allow next
of kin to “hold[ ] and protect[ ] the body until it is processed for burial, cremation, or other lawful disposition”) (emphasis added).
252 See
Personal Belongings, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/personal%20belongings [https://perma.cc/684B-JMM6]
(defining “personal belongings” as “items that belong to someone and that are
small enough to be carried”).
253 Cf. AM. AIRLINES, supra note 248 (giving directions for “shipping” human
remains, which implies that the next of kin need not travel with the remains in
order to ship them).
254 Stare Decisis, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/stare_decisis [https://perma.cc/B5S4-EDMD].
255 Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 470 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 55 U.S. 223, 233 (2009)).
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in an “inexorable command,” however.256 The Supreme Court
may reject stare decisis after concluding prior precedent is “unworkable” or “badly reasoned.”257 Stare decisis demands that the
reviewing court articulate a reason “beyond mere demonstration
that the overruled opinion was wrong.”258 Some factors determining whether the Court should overrule a prior opinion include (1) workability, (2) reliance, (3) anachronism, (4)
changes in the facts, and (5) institutional legitimacy.259 Applying
the stare decisis factors to Hodges shows that the Fifth Circuit
should overrule Hodges.
First, workability considers whether the decision is judicially
administrable and produces stable legal doctrine.260 The Fifth
Circuit decided Smith v. America West Airlines, Inc. the same day it
decided Hodges.261 Hodges held that an airline’s operation of
overhead storage relates to an airline’s safety, not an airline’s
“services,” and thus the ADA does not preempt the state law
claims.262 Smith held that an airline’s boarding of a hijacker relates to an airline’s services, not an airline’s safety, because the
claim relates to an airline’s boarding procedures.263 The Fifth
Circuit in Smith analyzed the issue based on “the scope of ‘services’ [the ADA] deregulated,” which included boarding procedures in both their economic and contractual dimensions.264
Both cases answered the question—does the ADA preempt state
law claims—using different legal analyses. Hodges analyzed the
issue by distinguishing an airline’s services from an airline’s operation and maintenance.265 Smith analyzed the issue by distin256 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
257 See id. at 827 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)).
258 Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
259 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (identifying some stare decisis factors previously set out by the
Court: “[T]he quality of the precedent’s reasoning; the precedent’s consistency
and coherence with previous or subsequent decisions; changed law since the
prior decision; changed facts since the prior decision; the workability of the precedent; the reliance interests of those who have relied on the precedent; and the
age of the precedent”).
260 Payne, 501 U.S. at 529–30.
261 See Smith v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 1995); Hodges
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 355 (5th Cir. 1995).
262 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 340.
263 Smith, 44 F.3d at 345, 347.
264 Id. at 347.
265 See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339–40.
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guishing claims with an economic dimension from claims with a
noneconomic dimension. Hodges and Smith leave lower courts
wondering what legal analysis to employ.
Second, the reliance factor considers whether people reasonably relied on the decision.266 Proponents of an expansive preemption clause may argue that any reinterpretation of the
clause undermines commercial investments in the aviation industry. For example, the $6.6 billion merger of Frontier and
Spirit Airlines, poised to create a massive, low-fare airline,267 may
be undermined by a court decision that makes it easier to sue a
commercial air carrier for state law claims. All commercial investments carry some reliance risk—even if the risk stems from
the market and not the law.268
Third, the anachronism factor considers whether subsequent
legal developments undermine the decision.269 One district
court established the three-pronged Rombom test to determine
whether the ADA preempted state law claims.270 The test first
considers whether the activity in dispute constitutes an airline
“service.”271 If the activity constitutes a service, the court then
considers whether the claim affects an airline’s services “directly” or “tenuously.”272 If the activity directly affects an airline’s
services, the court considers whether the “underlying tortious
conduct was reasonably necessary” to provide the service.273
Some lower federal courts, including lower courts within the
Fifth Circuit, apply Rombom.274 Other lower federal courts within
the Fifth Circuit apply a two-part inquiry to determine whether
266 See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414–15 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in part); Payne, v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
267 Bill Peters, Are Any Airline Stocks Buys After Industry Earnings, Spirit-JetBlue
Deal?, INV.’S BUS. DAILY (Aug. 9, 2022, 2:59 PM) https://www.investors.com/research/airline-stocks-to-buy-and-watch/ [https://perma.cc/3KVX-MCP8].
268 See generally Managing Strategic Risk in Aviation, DELOITTE, https://
www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/consumer-business/articles/disrupt-aviation.html [https://perma.cc/5HJ7-K6B4] (providing an overview of the various
risks associated with running an airline).
269 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
270 See Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 214, 221–22 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 222 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
389–90 (1992)).
273 Id.
274 See, e.g., Lewis v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 406, 414–15 (S.D. Tex.
1999); Peterson v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 246, 250–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Pena v. Brit. Airways, PLC (U.K.), No. 18-cv-6278, 2020 WL 3989055, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020).
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the ADA preempts a state law claim.275 The inquiry considers
whether a state law claim relates to “rates, routes, or services”
and whether the plaintiff’s recovery would constitute “an enactment or enforcement of a state law, regulation, standard, or
other substantive provision.”276 Lower federal courts’ application of other legal tests undermines Hodges.
The fourth factor considers whether the facts informing the
decision have changed.277 The Fifth Circuit decided Hodges almost thirty years ago, and states imposed economic regulations
on an airline’s rates, routes, or services almost forty-five years
ago.278 As time passes, the fear that states may reimpose previous
regulations lessens. Second, as discussed in Section II.B, the
COVID-19 pandemic had an unprecedented impact on the aviation industry.279 As cancellations, flight delays, and lost baggage
abound, courts should consider reeling in the ADA’s preemption clause to make it easier for passengers to sue airlines for
justice’s sake.
Fifth, the institutional legitimacy factor considers whether
there are special reasons to be concerned about the court’s
standing if its decision is overruled.280 The Texas Supreme
Court questioned Hodges’ reasoning:
We do not read those cases [Morales and Wolens] to suggest
that a tort claim related to airline services is not preempted if it
is related to aircraft operations or maintenance. Morales’ construction of “relating to . . .” could scarcely be broader. We do
not think the [Supreme Court] would have failed to mention an
exception to this construction large enough to encompass
claims relating to aircraft operations and maintenance.281
Reasonable justices and judges in state and federal courts
must arrive at the same conclusions when presented with similar
275 See, e.g., Onoh v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. 08-CV-1110-N, 2009 WL 10702913,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2009) (citing Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d
274 (Tex. 1996)).
276 Id.
277 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
278 Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting
that the ADA was concerned with “dimantl[ing] federal economic regulation”
and “prevent[ing] the states from frustrating the goals of deregulation”); see also
discussion supra Sections III.A, IV.A.
279 See discussion supra Section II.B.
280 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1414–15 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
281 Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 283 (Tex. 1996).
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facts to preserve the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy.282 The
Fifth Circuit’s institutional legitimacy would likely improve if it
overruled Hodges—at least in the eyes of the Texas Supreme
Court—since overruling would clarify this area of law.
D.

SUCCESS ELSEWHERE: A HALL PASS
CARRIERS

FOR

COMMERCIAL AIR

“[D]elay in the interment of dead bodies unnecessarily is repugnant to the sentiment of humanity and should not be
permitted . . . .”283
Courts enforce claims arising from the mishandling of human
remains against other entities.284 Hospitals may be held liable
for the negligent handling, transportation, and disposition of
human remains. For example, Texas provides mental anguish
damages to close family members for the mishandling of human
remains.285 Further, St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard establishes
that a plaintiff states a valid claim by asserting a hospital negligently disposes of the plaintiff’s stillborn infant’s body in an unmarked grave without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent.286
Funeral directors are liable for mishandling human remains,
including for misconduct related to “[r]etrieving the body and
transporting the body to the funeral home.”287 A special relationship exists when an entity assumes responsibility for disposing of
remains. The relationship between an entity disposing of a decedent’s remains and a decedent’s next of kin creates a legal duty
that exists regardless of contractual privity.288 A funeral home
owes individuals an “independent legal duty . . . to not mishandle a corpse” and thus to not interfere with an individual’s right
to bury a loved one.289 Public policy also supports holding funeral directors to a higher standard of care because “psychologiSee Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1411 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (discussing
the importance of stare decisis).
283 Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1041 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1934, writ
ref’d), superseded by statute, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002, as recognized in SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Nelson, 540 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. 2018).
284 See, e.g., Nelson, 540 S.W.3d at 540–41.
285 Id.
286 See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 650, 653 (Tex. 1987),
overruled by Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595–96 (Tex. 1993).
287 131 JACK PEGGS & KEVIN B. JOHNSON, MISHANDLING DECEASED BODIES, AM.
JURIS. TRIALS § 1 (2013) (emphasis added).
288 See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
289 Radar Funeral Home, Inc. v. Chavira, 553 S.W.3d. 10, 17 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2018, no pet.); see also Nelson, 540 S.W.3d at 546; Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 596.
282
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cal devastation [is] likely to result from any mistake which upsets
the expectations of the decedent’s bereaved family.”290
Commercial air carriers are the only entity insulated from liability arising from mishandling human remains. For example, a
Texas state court found a funeral director liable for delivering
the wrong body after transporting the remains across the state;291
however, Pan Am (a domestic airline that no longer exists)292
avoided liability based on similar facts.293 Pan Am presented the
next of kin with the wrong remains before delivering the actual
relative’s remains in a damaged and partially decomposed state
a week later.294 The Warsaw Convention governed the case because the Pan Am flight was international, not domestic. The
Warsaw Convention contains a similar preemption clause to the
ADA that preempted the plaintiffs’ state law claims arising from
Pan Am’s negligence. American Airlines also avoided liability for
damaging and ransacking a decedent’s casket under the Warsaw
Convention.295
One lower federal court in Texas recognized the inconsistency in how the law treats entities that mishandle human remains.296 The court relied on Texas precedents establishing a
cause of action for the negligent or wrongful mishandling of
human remains.297 In particular, the court drew from a Texas
case that found a rail company liable for the eight-hour delay in
transporting human remains.298 Because the airline delayed the
transportation of the decedent by willful acts or omissions, the
plaintiffs recovered against the airline regardless of the Warsaw
Convention’s liability limits.299 Under the contract of carriage,
the airline breached a duty because the airline and its agents did
not deliver the casket promptly.300 Neither the entity nor the
distance of the flight should determine whether a decedent’s
Allen v. Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
See Radar Funeral Home, 553 S.W.3d. at 17.
292 Pranjal Pande, 30 Years Ago Today Pan Am Ceased Operations, SIMPLE FLYING
(Dec. 4, 2021), https://simpleflying.com/pan-am-cease-operations/ [https://
perma.cc/X77N-MA5G].
293 See Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788, 789–90 (3d Cir. 1992).
294 Id. at 790.
295 See Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721, 722–23 (9th Cir. 1987).
296 See Tarar v. Pak. Int’l. Airlines, 554 F. Supp. 471 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
297 See id. at 480.
298 Id. (citing Lancaster v. Mebane, 247 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1924, writ ref’d)).
299 Id. at 479.
300 Id. at 481.
290
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2022]

INHUMANE: HOW THE AIRLINE

835

next of kin can recover for mishandling human remains. The
underlying conduct is still egregious, and the likelihood of psychological devastation from the misconduct is still high.
V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic deeply affected the world. The pandemic claimed more than a million American lives and devastated the domestic aviation industry.301 As the country
experiences more loss and domestic commercial air carrier service becomes more unreliable, a perfect storm threatens the
mishandling, delay, or misplacement of a loved one’s remains—
without a legal remedy available to grieving mothers, fathers,
husbands, or wives. Courts should interpret the ADA’s preemption clause more narrowly based on the ADA’s purpose, the
ADA’s text, stare decisis, and the law’s treatment of other entities that mishandle human remains.
301

See discussion supra Section II.B.

